Seduction--Promise to Marry--Refusal of Parental Consent by Miller, John D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 10
1956




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miller, John D. (1956) "Seduction--Promise to Marry--Refusal of Parental Consent," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 44 : Iss. 4 , Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol44/iss4/10
REcENT CASES
of ownership over an inter vivos trust; where the settlor retains the
power to revest in himself title to any part of the trust, or to change
the beneficiary, the corpus of the trust may be included in his gross
taxable estate. 10 But in the instant case, the policies were irrevocably
assigned, and no incidents of ownership were retained by the donor.
In this situation, courts have held that proceeds of such policies are
not taxable to the decedents estate, since he has retained no interest
in, or control over, the policies and since there is no transfer of prop-
erty at the time of his death. The transferee acquires a vested interest
at the time of the assignment.1
The premium-payment test may nevertheless make taxable to the
donor that portion of the proceeds for which he has paid the premiums,
if he has not paid a tax at the time of the transfer. But in the instant
case, the insured paid a gift tax when he made the irrevocable assign-
ment to the plaintiffs, and since the transfer had previously been com-
pleted, an additional tax would be direct and imposed by reason of the
ownership of the property. As one court expressed this view:
...Gifts inter vivos ...may be an appropriate subject of taxation
by the federal government.
But it is doubtful whether such gifts, completed during the life
of the donor, could be lawfully brought into the gross estate of a
decedent for the purpose of measuring a tax upon his estate. I should
expect such an attempt to fail for the reason that the transfer would
have no reasonable relation to the event of death.'
2
It is believed that the instant case reached an equitable result, and
that the owners of insurance policies should be allowed to assign them
absolutely, inter vivos, paying a gift tax thereon, without the proceeds
of these policies being taxed again at the assignor's death.
ROH3ERT A. PALmER
SEDUCrION-PREISE TO MARjRY-EusAL OF PARENTAL CoNsENT-Ap-
pellant, a boy under twenty-one years of age, was tried and convicted
of the statutory crime of seduction.' Both during and before the trial
10 White v. Erskine, 47 F. 2d 1014 (1st Cir. 1931).
11 Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 79 F. 2d 295 (3rd Cir. 1935). See also Helvering
v. Parker, 84 F. 2d 838 (8th Cir. 1936).
12 Sampson v. U.S., supra note 9 at 98.
1Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 436.010 (1955) provides: "(1) Any person who, under
promise of marriage, seduces and has carnal knowledge of any female under
twenty-one years of age, shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than one
nor more than five years.
(2) No prosecution under subsection (1) of this section shall be instituted
where the person charged has married the girl seduced or offers and is willing to
marnj her ... " (Italics supplied.)
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the appellant offered and was willing to marry the prosecutrix, but his
father refused his consent as required by marriage statute.2 On appeal
the appellant asked the court for relief from his dilemma, contending
that, since he had offered and was willing to marry the girl, he had
qualified for the exoneration afforded by the seduction statute and
should be relieved of prosecution even though he was unable to com-
ply with his offer. In granting him relief, the appellate court held
that, although a defendant guilty of seduction cannot be permitted to
escape punishment by hiding behind the refusal of parental consent,
such parental consent is not necessary in order to allow him to marry
the girl and qualify for exoneration under the seduction statute. Combs
v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W. 2d 714 (Ky. 1955).
This case presented an unprecedented problem to the Kentucky
court. Many times the court had faced the task of interpreting the
seduction statute,3 and likewise the "consent-to-marry" statute,4 but
never before had the court been confronted with the necessity of dis-
pensing with either in order to gain the social value provided by the
other.
In dealing with this problem the court could have selected any one
of three possible solutions. The court could have ruled: (1) that the
exoneration clause of the seduction statute cannot be applied in favor
of the defendant where his parents prevent its application by denying
their consent to marriage; (2) that the exoneration clause applies in
favor of the defendant allowing him exoneration even though his par-
ents refuse their consent; (3) that the statute requiring parental con-
sent for marriage has no application when the minor has been con-
victed of seduction and is faced with the penalty of incarceration or
marriage to the complaining party.
In rejecting the first possible solution above, the court took cog-
nizance of the almost universal rule that refusal of parental consent
to marry the prosecutrix is no defense to criminal prosecution for se-
duction.5 The court wisely brushed aside this solution, but in doing
so it was faced with the problem of avoiding if possible the undesirable
result of confining the defendant in a school of reform. This, the court
2 Ky. R3v. STAT. sec. 402.210 (1955) provides: "If either of the parties is
under twenty-one years of age and not before married, no license shall issue with-
out the consent of his or her father or guardian .. " (Italics supplied.)
3 Commonwealth v. White, 289 Ky. 99, 157 S.W. 2d 747 (1941); Barkley v.
Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 201, 157 S.W. 373 (1913); Commonwealth v. Wright,
16 K.L.R. 251, 27 S.W. 815 (1894).
4 Mangrum v. Mangrum, 310 Ky. 226, 220 S.W. 2d 406 (1949); Crummies
Creek Coal Co. v. Napier, 246 Ky. 569, 55 S.W. 2d 839 (1932).
5 Bethel v. State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S.W. 740 (1924); People v. Kehoe 123
Cal. 224, 55 Pac. 911 (1898); Harvey v. State, 53 S.W. 102 (Tex. 1899); 79
C.J.S. 993 (1953).
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reasoned would defeat the very essence of the seduction statute, since
its main object is to avoid the ruin of the victim by encouraging the
guilty party to marry her rather than merely to punish the party
guilty of the crime.,
In rejecting the second possible solution the court followed the well
established rule that a defendant cannot be exonerated from all blame
merely because his parents refuse to consent to his marriage.7 To
exonerate the defendant would even more clearly defeat the purpose
of the seduction statute.
In view of the undesirability of the first two possible solutions the
court chose the third possibility as the one most suitable in this case.
This result the court reached by reading the seemingly inconsistent
sections of the two statutes with the aim of weighing their social
value. In support of its solution of the problem the court interpreted
the seduction statute to have a "specific policy" paramount to the
broad, general policy governing the safe-guards upon marriages pro-
vided in the consent-to-marry statute. To comply with the specific
purpose and interest of the seduction statute, the court thought it wise
to dispense with the requirement of parental consent.
This decision was sound in holding that refusal of parental consent
did not cause such impossibility of marriage as would be a condition
for complete exoneration. To hold that refusal of parental consent
would result in defendant's exoneration on grounds of impossibility of
complying with conditions of the statute would allow one under
majority to ply his seductive skill in an uninhibited manner, encompass
the ruin of his victim, and afterwards hide behind refusal of parental
consent to validate his promise to marry." An even stronger reason
for not allowing refusal of parental consent to operate as a defense is
the possibility of collusion between the defendant and his father.
Courts have, no doubt, taken these factors into consideration when
faced with the argument that lack of parental consent should be a
defense. For, as said by the court in Merrell v. State:
The law requires a promise to marry to be made in good faith, and
takes no note of appellant's inability to consummate the marriage. As
far as the crime is concerned, it is already committed, and appellant
can only escape punishment for his crime by complying with the
statute.... (Italics supplied.)9
0 Collins v. State, 54 Ga. App. 246, 187 S.E. 621 (1936); People ex rel
Sharff v. Frost, 198 N.Y. 110, 91 N.E. 376 (1910); Note, 31 Ky. L.J. 189 (1943).
7 State v. Brock, 186 Mo. 457, 85 S.W. 595 (1905), 85 A.L.R. 123 (1933);
47 Am. Jun. 640 (1943); 79 C.J.S. 993 (1953).
8 Supra note 6.
942 Tex. Cr. Rep. 19, 57 S.W. 289, 290 (1900).
KENTUcKY LAw JouRNAL
It is fortunate that the court allowed the defendant to promise to
marry the girl notwithstanding lack of parental consent, which the
statute10 otherwise would require of an underaged party. To rule
otherwise would mean that an underage defendant could not comply
with the law. On the other hand a defendant but a few years older
would have no trouble in performing the statutory requirement of
marriage or offer to marry. This, of course, would create a funda-
mental and irrational variance in the application of the seduction
statute.12 Certainly, one cannot infer that the means of exoneration
provided in the law is to be applied with varying degrees, depending
on the age of the violator.1 3 On the contrary, the law places all viola-
tors on the same footing, with the primary emphasis on the welfare of
the girl.14
One is readily compelled to go along with the court with regard
to the evaluation it placed upon the social purpose sought to be ac-
complished by the seduction statute and the exception to the marriage
requirement law. The broad, general interpretation which the court
placed on the consent-to-marry statute is well considered. There are
cases where underage parties marry without parental consent and are
still accepted by society. 14 In fact, the law has long recognized that
marriage by underage parties is not an invalid marriage.15 It seems
'0 Supra note 2.
11 This is the argument often set forth by the nonage defendants. Although
the argument seems to have some merit, the courts generally have refused to allow
it as a defense. It is believed that the refusal results from the fact that the courts
interpreted the seduction statute as being primarily "criminal nature", thus they
were inclined to place the emphasis upon a conviction of the defendant rather
than to look for a rationalization that would allow him to marry without parental
consent.
Since the court in this case did not construe the statute as criminal in nature
they were not obliged to convict the defendant even though his parents refused
to consent to his marrying the prosecutrix. On the other hand, it chose to dispense
with the parental consent to marry. This in effect places all defendants convicted
of seduction on the same footing regardless of age, eliminating any injustice that
might result from lack of parental consent for nonage defendants.
12 Supra note 1. Note words, "Any person".
13 People v. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134 (1873). In this old case the statute was
held to protect female chastity; for, as the court observed, "[W]henever it shall
be true of any country that the women, as a general fact are not chaste, the
foundations of civil society will be broken up. Fortunately in our country an un-
chaste female is comparatively a rare exception to the general rule ... "
This, it is submitted, is still the attitude of the law. For an inconsistent
sociological view based upon present day factual data, reference may be made to
the Kinsey studies.
14 It is submitted that there are numerous incidents where nonage parties go
into a neighboring state for the sole purpose of marrying without parental consent.
Although the state of residence may have power to void these marriages, it does
not usually interfere. The state apparently applies the rule that validity of a mar-
riage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage is performed.
15 Supra note 7; Williams v. White, - Tex. Cr. Rep. 263 S.W. 2d 666 (Tex.
1953); 55 C.J.S. 821 (1948).
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that society simply does not place an imprecation on marriage without
parental consent; nor can it be said such marriages place an exceptional
curse on society. This was undoubtedly within the court's thought in
reaching this decision. It might be further noted that the courts have
usually interpreted the consent-to-marry statute as merely directory
at least in the absence of an express provision in the text that the mar-
riage shall be void if parental consent is lacking.' In view of these de-
cisions it is not at all alarming that this court chose to dispense with
parental consent to marry when required to achieve a more prevalent
interest.
In applying the seduction laws the courts have been somewhat
more rigid.'7 It is indeed fortunate that this court labeled the policy of
the seduction statute as being one of "specific" policy in favor of mar-
riage, for the courts have long recognized that marriage is the ultimate
desire of the seduction statutes.' 8 As stated in an early Kentucky de-
cision:
The marriage of the parties is the purpose, intent, hope, and spirit of
the statute. Within its keeping, the past misery and shame may be
forgotten, the future happiness of both secured....
... [T]he statute [is] so construed although the seducer be forced
almost to the very doors of the penitentiary before offering to fufill
his promise of marriage. (Italics supplied.)19
It has been said that the law on seduction is not primarily criminal
in nature, but aims primarily to force the defendant to fulfill his
promise to marry the seduced girl.20 Whatever the nature of the
statute, it is submitted that the court in this case interpreted the law
in the light of fundamental justice and sound social policy. In so do-
ing, the court unequivocally established the rule that a nonage de-
fendant need not have the consent of his parents in order to marry the
seduced girl and receive exoneration for the crime of seduction.
Jonv D. MnzLR
TonTs-LIBEL-FAIn COi rENT BY A NEWSPAPER WHEN A PERSON IS Ac-
CUSED OF CiufE-Plaintiffs brought an action against defendant news-
paper publishers on a claim for libel arising out of a story which de-
fendants printed concerning the arrest of the plaintiffs on a charge of
stealing a cow. The newspaper article was printed in the following
form:
'16 Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415 II. 118, 112 N.E. 2d 714 (1953); Williams v.
White, supra note 16.
17 Supra note 5.
18 Commonwealth v. Wright, 16 Ky. L.R. 251, 252, 27 S.W. 815, 816 (1894).
19 Ibid. 20 Note, 31 Ky. L.J. 189 (1943).
